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“The formalisation of the fact that the audit committee is responsible for the hiring and firing 
of the audit firm has changed and strengthened the triangular relationship between audit 
committee, management and audit firm, in a way that is both subtle but very profound.” By 
Samuel DiPiazza, the global chief executive of PwC (Independent eye brings new focus on 
audits, Financial Times, 17 April, 2003). 
 
1. Introduction 
As part of corporate governance structure, the role of audit committees in the 
oversight of financial reporting and audit processes continues to be of importance to 
regulators, academics, the accounting profession, and investors alike (e.g., Blue 
Ribbon Committee 1999; Dhaliwal et al. 2010; Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002). While 
extant studies examine the relations between audit committee (AC hereafter) 
attributes and both audit inputs and financial reporting quality, it is unclear whether 
the relation between AC characteristics and financial reporting quality is driven 
indirectly by the impact of AC attributes on audit effort and auditor quality, or 
directly by the impact of AC attributes on the ability and incentives of management to 
manipulate accounting information. If an AC is perceived by management to be 
competent and independent, then the likelihood of low financial reporting quality may 
be reduced ex ante irrespective of audit inputs. 
Another important concern in examining the triangular relation between AC 
characteristics, audit input and financial reporting quality is that the relation is 
affected by correlated omitted variables and that AC composition is endogenous. 
Regarding the former, when the effect of AC attributes on audit inputs is examined, 
both audit inputs and AC attributes can be affected by unobservable exogenous 
determinants such as the level of agency costs and managerial bargaining power.1 The 
endogeneity concern is attributed to the possibility that board and AC attributes can 
be de facto an outcome of the equilibrium in the market for directors (Hermalin and 
Weisbach 1998). To the extent that high quality directors choose to serve on boards of 
companies with higher financial reporting quality (Rubin and Segal 2012), AC 
characteristics can be influenced by a firm’s reporting quality. A failure to consider 
the endogenous nature of AC governance characteristics is often a threat to the 
                                                 
1  When managerial power is high, ACs can be less competent and less independent because 
management would choose AC members that are relatively weak and less likely to prevent 
management from engaging in earnings manipulation. At the same time, management is likely to 
demand lower audit fees so that they are less constrained to manipulate. In such instances the positive 
association between audit fees and governance is simply attributed to managerial power, and thus 
failing to control for this variable would lead to the erroneous conclusion of a positive association 
between audit fees and the competence and independence of the committee. 
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validity of empirical findings (Carcello et al. 2011), which makes it hard to draw 
inferences on the causal impact of AC attributes on audit inputs or financial reporting 
quality. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide new empirical evidence on the 
effectiveness of AC that addresses both of these concerns in the literature. To address 
the problem of AC endogeneity, we take advantage of the fact that some firms, but 
not all, were forced to change the composition of AC in response to the reforms 
mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. The exogenously mandated AC 
reforms allow us to examine the causal impact of changes in AC attributes (financial 
expertise, size, and independence) on both audit inputs (measured by audit fees and 
the appointment of an industry specialist auditor) and financial reporting quality 
(measured by restatement of financial reports).2 Furthermore, to explore the channels 
through which AC attributes impact financial reporting quality, our study employs a 
research design integrating the triangular relationship between AC characteristics, 
audit input, and financial reporting quality. Since the reforms could potentially affect 
both audit inputs and financial reporting quality, this setting provides an opportunity 
to examine the direct impact of AC characteristics on financial reporting quality by 
allowing us to test whether the effect of the reforms on financial reporting quality, if 
any, exists after controlling for changes in audit inputs. This analysis intends to 
examine the benefits of strengthening AC attributes vis-à-vis the ability of the AC not 
only to detect potential manipulation through the audit process itself, but also to deter 
management from engaging in such manipulation.  
The clear goal of the AC reforms brought about by the new regulations was to 
curb financial reporting irregularities through vigilant and informed oversight by a 
strong, effective and independent AC (SEC 2003). However, this goal is viewed with 
skepticism by some observers. For example, Romano (2005) suggests that the reforms 
are largely symbolic in nature and a form of window dressing. He argues that the 
reforms mandated by SOX resulted from a desire by lawmakers to appear responsive 
to upcoming elections in the face of increasing public concerns over financial 
reporting scandals and the reforms will fail to improve corporate governance because 
                                                 
2  We use restatements to identify substandard financial reporting because restatements are an 
acknowledgement that prior financial statements are not in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles (Palmrose and Scholz 2004). Outside directors and auditors of restating firms 
thus face a high risk of turnover and reputational penalties (Srinivasan 2005; Hennes et al. 2011). We 
perform robustness analysis using accrual-based measures in Section 5.6. 
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managers can select directors that meet the requirements of the reforms but are still 
unduly supportive of management. Other studies also provide arguments consistent 
with unfavorable views of the reforms: Both managerial power hypothesis (Cohen et 
al. 2007) and institutional theory (Barreto and Baden-Fuller 2006) argue that the AC 
reforms can be purely symbolic or ceremonial if managers simply invite their friends 
to serve as passive directors or if firms just mimic other firms’ governance practice. 
Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of board and AC in reducing the incidence of 
financial reporting problems in prior studies is also somewhat mixed.3 Therefore, it is 
an important empirical question whether the AC reforms brought about by SOX were 
successful in improving financial reporting quality. 
Another puzzling issue is how ACs are involved in the governance process to 
prevent misstatements of financial reports. Although AC characteristics and their 
relation to various reporting outcomes are important, the extant literature largely fails 
to examine the process used by ACs when they fulfill responsibilities (Beasley et al. 
2009; Cohen et al. 2004). An important policy change by SOX relates to the 
relationship between the AC and the auditor (SEC 2003). The AC is now mandated to 
hire and fire the auditor, set compensation for the auditor, and engage in specific 
communication with the auditor. On the one hand, if this change leads ACs to rely 
more on external audit functions for the detection of financial reporting problems, one 
may not observe a significant association between AC attributes and the likelihood of 
misstatements of financial reports, in the absence of the change in audit inputs. On the 
other hand, if the increase in the competence and independence of ACs affects the 
effectiveness of internal controls and management’s ex ante assessment of the 
likelihood of detection of accounting manipulation, the AC reforms will reduce the 
likelihood of substandard reporting regardless of the change in accounting inputs. We 
shed light on this issue by examining whether the AC reforms enhance the financial 
reporting quality even without the improvement in audit inputs.4  
                                                 
3 While studies find that firms with ACs that are more independent and/or inclusive of financial experts 
exhibit higher accruals quality (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2010; Klein 2002; Jenkins 2002) and a lower 
likelihood of misstated financial statements (e.g., Agrawal and Chandra 2005; Cohen et al. 2010), 
Larcker et al. (2007) report that the independence and size of board and AC are not significantly 
associated with the quality of accruals and the likelihood of a restatement. 
4 This issue is important in light of mixed evidence on the association between board/AC attributes and 
audit fees. Using the data in the pre-SOX period, some studies find that ACs with more independent 
directors or financial experts are associated with higher audit fees (Abbott et al. 2003; Carcello et al. 
2002), while others find that better governance is associated with lower audit fees (Griffin et al. 2008; 
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As mentioned earlier, we examine the AC reforms mandated by SOX to test 
our predictions. In response to accounting scandals in 2001 and 2002, the US 
Congress enacted SOX on July 29, 2002. Several requirements of the Act have a 
direct impact on the composition of ACs. In particular, Section 301 requires that all 
AC members be independent directors, that is, they must not receive compensation 
from the company other than a director or committee fee, or be affiliated with the 
company or any of its subsidiaries. Section 407 requires that the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) issue rules whereby ACs include at least one financial 
expert. Following the enactment of SOX, on January 15, 2003 the SEC issued Rule 
10A-3, which mirrors SOX 301 and SOX 407 by requiring that firms have only 
independent directors and include at least one financial expert on their audit 
committees. In line with this Rule, Section 303A of the NYSE’s Listed Company 
Manual mandates that all listed firms meet the requirements of Rule 10A-3. In 
addition, the NYSE stipulated that the AC include at least three independent directors 
by October 2004.5 NASDAQ imposed similar guidelines. 
The new rules primarily affected firms that were not in compliance with one 
or more of the requirements described above and were thus obliged to change the 
composition of their AC (‘non-compliant firms’). This setting provides a natural 
experiment to investigate the impact of changes in the composition of ACs on audit 
inputs and financial reporting quality for three reasons. First, the AC is now directly 
responsible for the hiring, performance evaluation, and compensation of external 
auditors. The committee also oversees financial reporting and disclosure by 
monitoring the choice of accounting policies and principles as well as the internal 
control process (Blue Ribbon Committee 1999; DeZoort 1997). Second, because the 
reform was exogenously mandated, the changes to AC composition under this reform 
                                                                                                                                           
Tsui et al. 2001). A study also finds that more independent and active ACs are more likely to appoint 
an industry specialist auditor (Abbott and Parker 2000). 
5  Prior to the adoption of these policies, listed firms were subject to the three-member and 
independence requirements. However, the exchanges allowed for exceptions, which resulted in a large 
number of non-compliance cases. Specifically, in December 1999, the NYSE and NASDAQ mandated 
listed companies to maintain ACs with at least three directors, “all of whom have no relationship to the 
company that may interfere with the exercise of their independence from management and the 
company.” However, NASDAQ Rule 4310(c)(26)(B)(ii) allowed the board under “limited 
circumstances” to appoint any non-current employee or family member to the audit committee, and 
NYSE Section 303.01(B)(3)(b) gave the board broader discretion in appointing directors with business 
relationships to the firm. If the board determines that the independence of the director is not 
compromised by the business relationship, then that director may serve on the board's AC. Thus, some 
firms maintained an AC that consists of less than three independent members, while others already met 
the requirements related to three-member independence of the AC prior to the adoption of the new rule. 
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can be attributed largely to the rulings rather than to unobservable firm or CEO 
characteristics, thereby mitigating endogeneity concerns. Third, because a relatively 
large number of firms were affected by the new regulation, we have a reasonable 
sample size for empirical tests.6 
We investigate the impact of the AC reform using a difference-in-difference 
approach by comparing compliant and non-compliant firms. The non-compliant 
sample includes all firms that did not meet any of the three new AC requirements in 
2002 but became compliant by 2005. The compliant sample comprises all firms that 
were compliant with all three requirements in both 2002 and 2005, namely, (1) at 
least one financial expert, (2) at least three members, and (3) only independent 
directors. We examine audit fees, the likelihood of industry specialist auditor (ISA) 
appointment,7 and the likelihood of restatement in the pre- and post-reform periods 
for each non-compliant subsample along with its matched compliant sample obtained 
from a match design analysis. 
Our results reveal that non-compliant firms experienced a greater increase in 
audit fees and were more likely to appoint an ISA relative to their matched compliant 
firms in the post-SOX period. Specifically, firms that were non-compliant with the 
financial expert or three-member requirement exhibited a greater increase in audit 
fees relative to their matched compliant sample. All three non-compliant subsamples 
experienced a significantly greater increase in ISA appointments. Further, non-
compliant firms experienced a greater increase in financial reporting quality in the 
post-SOX period as evidenced by the greater decline in the likelihood of restatement 
relative to their matched compliant firms. Taken together, these findings suggest that 
firms forced to change their AC composition by the reforms exhibit greater 
improvements in audit inputs and financial reporting quality. Hence, the evidence 
suggests that AC attributes have a causal impact on audit inputs and on financial 
reporting quality. 
                                                 
6 SOX includes several other provisions that are also likely to affect financial reporting quality such as 
the prohibition of certain auditor non-audit services (Section 201), the assessment of internal controls 
(Sections 302 and 404), and CEO/CFO certification (Section 906). However, because these provisions 
affected all firms, and because we use a difference-in-difference approach, we expect that the effects of 
these provisions would cancel out.  
7 We define an auditor as an ISA if the auditor has the largest market share in a two-digit SIC industry 
in a particular year at both the city level and the national level. Recent research suggests that city-
specific office-level industry leadership, when combined with national-level leadership, generates 
significantly higher audit quality and audit fee premiums, while national-level industry leadership 
alone has little effect (e.g., Francis et al. 2005; Reichelt and Wang 2010). 
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The greater reduction in restatements for non-compliant firms in the post-SOX 
period could be attributed to improved competence and independence of the AC, 
which would increase the detection of misstatements through more effective internal 
controls and thus constrain opportunistic reporting by managers. Alternatively, it 
could be attributed to greater auditing effort and higher auditor quality (as evidenced 
by the increases in audit fees and ISA appointments) subsequent to the AC reforms. 
We explore these two channels through which AC attributes impact financial 
reporting quality by examining whether the reduction in restatements in the post-
reform period is attributed to the change in audit fees and ISA appointments. Our 
findings suggest that the reduction in restatements for non-compliant firms is largely 
independent of the changes in audit fees and ISA appointments, which suggests that 
the enhanced AC monitoring capabilities by the reforms increase the financial 
reporting quality even without the improvement in audit inputs. We also find that our 
results are robust to several alternative research design choices. 
This study contributes to the literature by enhancing our understanding of the 
role played by ACs in detecting and deterring financial misstatements. While prior 
research documents a negative relation between the effectiveness of an AC and the 
likelihood of misstatement (Abbott et al. 2004; Agrawal and Chandra 2005), it is 
unclear whether this result is driven by the monitoring capacity of a more competent 
and independent AC, improved auditing effort, or higher quality auditors (Caramanis 
and Lennox 2008; Chin and Chi 2009). Our findings indicate that the AC 
characteristics play an important role in mitigating substandard financial reporting, 
even after controlling for the change in audit fees and auditor selection, suggesting 
that the effect of the former is largely independent of the effect of the latter.  
Second, this study contributes to the literature that examines the effects of AC 
attributes on audit inputs and accounting outcomes (e.g., Abbott et al. 2004; Agrawal 
and Chandra 2005; Dechow et al. 1996). We extend prior findings with pre-SOX 
period data by examining the effect of the adoption of SOX which introduced 
significant changes in the role, composition, and the relationship with auditors, of 
ACs. Furthermore, we alleviate endogeneity concerns by analyzing a regulatory event 
that causes an exogenous change to ACs. In addition, our difference-in-difference 
approach controls for any confounding economic events that occurred during the 
legislation event period and hence could have affected audit inputs and reporting 
outcomes in all firms. The evidence provided by our study therefore directly speaks to 
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the importance of ACs in the oversight of the financial reporting and audit processes.  
Finally, our study also contributes to the literature on the efficacy of SOX 
requirements in relation to the AC composition. While recent studies (e.g., Cohen et 
al. 2010; Dhaliwal et al. 2010; Goh 2009) examine this issue using post-SOX data, 
existing research has yet to describe the extent to which AC attributes are linked to 
audit inputs and restatements. Our findings suggest that the AC reforms improved 
both audit input quality and the reliability of financial reporting, lending support to 
the view that the SOX requirements have enhanced financial reporting quality. Thus, 
the results of our study will be of interest to investors and policymakers. The 
remainder of the study proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we develop the hypotheses. 
In Section 3 we describe the data and report univariate results. Section 4 presents the 
main empirical results. In Section 5 we discuss sensitivity analyses and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Audit Committee, Auditing, and Financial Reporting Failure 
Since ownership and control are separate for most public firms, managers may 
have an incentive to misreport financial results for opportunistic purposes (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Research suggests that independent directors who serve on the AC 
have a strong incentive to detect and prevent such opportunistic reporting behavior by 
management to avoid possible litigation and protect their reputation capital (Fama 
1980; Fama and Jensen 1983). Financial reporting failure has a significant negative 
impact on the reputation capital of directors and consequently on the likelihood of 
obtaining additional board seats, especially if the director serves on the AC 
(Srivivasan 2005). Hence, AC members have an even greater incentive to reduce the 
risk of financial reporting failure.  
Stressing the role of both the AC and the auditor in deterring financial 
reporting failure, Elifsen and Messier (2000) argue that the following four conditions 
should be met for the restatement of financial reports. First, there is a material 
misstatement that can be attributed to opportunistic manipulation by management or 
weak internal controls. Second, the misstatement is not detected by internal controls, 
which include AC monitoring. Third, it is also not detected by the external auditor. 
Fourth, the misstatement is subsequently discovered. Based on these criteria and 
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holding management opportunism constant, the risk of financial reporting failure can 
be reduced either by increasing the competence and independence of the AC and/or 
by a improving the auditing process of the external auditor. 
The AC reforms mandated by SOX can affect the likelihood of restatement 
through two channels. First, improved audit inputs potentially reduce the likelihood of 
restatement by enhancing auditing quality. Second, the change in the competence, 
size, and independence of the AC increases the probability that substandard reporting 
will be detected, which should deter management from engaging in opportunistic 
reporting behavior in the first place.  
We first develop our hypothesis on the relation between AC attributes and 
audit inputs. We then discuss our hypothesis on the relation between AC attributes 
and restatements. Finally, we discuss whether the impact of the AC reforms on 
accounting restatements can be attributed to the change in audit inputs, the change in 
the competence, size and independence of the AC, or both. 
 
2.2 Relation between Audit Committee Attributes and Audit Inputs 
The reforms imposed by SOX were aimed to enhance the competence 
(through the requirement of at least one financial expert) and independence of ACs 
(through the requirement of at least three members, all of which are independent). A 
more competent and independent AC is likely to require greater auditing effort and 
higher quality auditors for three reasons. First, such a committee is likely to demand 
stronger corporate governance, prompting the firm to devote more resources to the 
auditing process and thereby reducing the likelihood of governance failure in the form 
of misstatements ex ante. Second, as the AC’s competence improves, the AC 
members are likely to better understand management opportunism and the negative 
consequences of a financial reporting failure, and hence to require greater audit inputs 
that aim to alleviate such concerns. Third, a larger and more independent AC has 
greater bargaining power, which allows the committee to demand and obtain greater 
auditing effort and higher quality auditors.  
Consistent with the arguments above, a majority of studies using the data in 
the pre-SOX period find that more competent and independent ACs are related to 
better quality audit inputs. Studies show that ACs with more independent directors or 
financial experts are associated with higher audit fees in the US (Abbott et al. 2003; 
Carcello et al. 2002) and the UK (Collier and Gregory 1996). The evidence supports 
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the notion that more competent and independent ACs demand greater auditing effort 
from auditors. Studies also find that AC attributes are related to the selection of 
auditor. For example, Abbott and Parker (2000) find that firms with ACs comprised 
exclusively of independent directors that meet at least twice a year are more likely to 
appoint an ISA. Chen and Zhou (2007) find that companies with more independent 
directors and financial experts in the AC terminated their relationship with Andersen 
sooner after its failure at Enron and they were more likely to select a Big 4 successor 
auditor. Lennox and Park (2007) find that firms with a more independent AC are less 
likely to appoint an audit firm where key officers are alumni of that audit firm in an 
effort to promote auditor independence.  
Although studies above point to a positive association between AC 
competence and independence and audit inputs, some studies report a negative 
association, arguing that enhanced competence and independence can result in fewer 
resources being allocated to auditing because improved governance can reduce the 
inherent control risk. For example, Bedard and Johnston (2004) find evidence that 
auditors consider earnings management risk and governance risk when planning their 
auditing effort and billing rates. In particular, they document an increase in auditing 
effort when earnings management and governance risk are high. Similarly, Griffin et 
al. (2008) and Tsui et al. (2001) report a negative association between better 
governance and audit fees.  
Given that the requirements of SOX – that the AC include at least one 
financial expert, that the AC have a minimum of three members, and that all members 
of the AC be independent directors – primarily affected firms that were non-
compliant with any one of these requirements, the impact of the reforms on audit 
inputs can be gauged relative to the sample of compliant firms, since these firms 
experienced no change in AC governance. Accordingly, we compare the changes in 
audit inputs between the pre- and post-SOX period for a sample of compliant and 
non-compliant firms. Our hypotheses on the relation between the AC reform and the 
changes in audit inputs are thus as follows (stated in null form): 
H1a: Non-compliant and compliant firms experience a similar change in audit 
fees from the pre- to the post-SOX period. 
 
H1b: Non-compliant and compliant firms experience a similar change in the 
likelihood of appointing an ISA from the pre- to the post-SOX period. 
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2.3 Relation between Audit Committee Attributes and Financial Reporting Failure 
Given that ACs primarily oversee the financial reporting process and its 
quality, another stream of research examines the link between AC characteristics and 
financial reporting outcomes such as earnings management, accruals quality, and 
restatements. A large number of studies with pre-SOX period data suggest that a more 
independent and competent AC reduces the likelihood of financial reporting failure 
and is associated with better earnings and accruals quality. Specifically, AC 
independence is associated with a reduced likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting 
(Dechow et al. 1996; Beasley et al. 2000), better accruals quality (Klein 2002; Jenkins 
2002), and a reduced likelihood of restatement (Abbott et al. 2004; Agrawal and 
Chandra 2005). Similarly, firms with more competent ACs whose members include a 
financial expert are less likely to have internal control deficiencies (Zhang et al. 2007), 
financial reporting problems (McMullen and Raghunandan 1996), or restatements 
(Cohen et al. 2010). Using post-SOX data, Dhaliwal et al. (2010) find that accruals 
quality is positively related to accounting expertise on the AC. 
Although studies above point to a positive association between AC 
effectiveness and financial reporting quality, Larcker et al. (2007) provide somewhat 
contradictory evidence. They examine the association between reporting quality and 
14 principal components extracted from various governance variables. Two of the 
components are related to the AC size and independence. Inconsistent with findings 
above, they show that these components are not significantly associated with signed 
accruals and the likelihood of restatement. Thus, the overall conclusions from prior 
studies are mixed. 
Our second hypothesis relates changes in AC competence and independence 
to the likelihood of financial reporting failure. Similar to above, we posit that the 
improvement in financial reporting quality (i.e., the reduction in the likelihood of 
restatement) in the post-SOX period is greater for non-compliant firms than compliant 
firms, leading to the following hypothesis (stated in null): 
H2: Non-compliant and compliant firms experience a similar change in the 
likelihood of restatement from the pre- to the post-SOX period. 
 
2.4 Disentangling the Impacts of Changes in Governance and Audit Inputs on 
Financial Reporting Failure 
When examining the relation between the AC reforms and the likelihood of 
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restatement, it is unclear whether the relation would be driven by improved 
governance per se, enhanced audit inputs, or a combination of the two. In other words, 
there is ambiguity as to whether the reduction in financial reporting failures (if any) 
can be attributed to improved AC competence and independence, greater auditing 
effort by higher quality auditors, or both. 
The relation between audit fees and restatements is likely endogenous, hence 
it is not clear whether audit fees are positively or negatively associated with the 
likelihood of restatement. On the one hand, higher fees are likely to be associated 
with better audit quality (Caramanis and Lennox 2008), and thus misstatements are 
more likely to be detected, which suggests a negative relation between fees and 
restatements.8 On the other hand, audit fees may reflect an auditor’s assessment of the 
ex ante probability of financial reporting failure, which suggests a positive association. 
In addition, higher fees may increase the auditor’s desire to retain the client and in 
turn harm auditor independence, which would increase the probability of financial 
reporting failure (Choi et al. 2010). Studies on the relation between audit inputs and 
restatements provide mixed results. Empirical findings based on pre-SOX data are 
broadly consistent with a positive association between audit fees and restatements 
(Kinney et al. 2004; Stanley and DeZoort 2007; Li and Lin 2007). In contrast, after 
controlling for the quality of internal controls, Blankley et al. (2012) find that 
abnormal audit fees are negatively associated with restatements in the post-SOX 
period. Our third hypothesis (stated in null) relates the change in the likelihood of 
restatement to the change in audit inputs: 
 
H3a: The greater decline in restatements from the pre- to the post-SOX period 
for non-compliant firms relative to compliant firms, if any, is not associated 
with the change in audit inputs. 
 
While the supporters of the AC reforms argue that mandates to increase the 
AC independence and competence would increase oversight of firm managers and 
thereby reduce the likelihood of financial reporting irregularities, an alternative and 
more skeptical view suggests that the AC reforms surrounding SOX can be largely 
window dressing. For example, the managerial power hypothesis (e.g., Cohen et al. 
2007; Romano 2005) poses that if managers simply invite their friends to serve as 
                                                 
8 While Chin and Chih (2010) document a negative association between restatement and ISA, this 
relation can be endogenous as well. 
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passive directors, the AC will be purely symbolic as it will be consistently supportive 
of management. Similarly, institutional theory (e.g., Scott 1987; Barreto and Baden-
Fuller 2006) emphasizes the symbolic and ceremonial role of governance, arguing 
that most firms’ governance structures become similar as a result of regulation or the 
mimicking of other firms. Based on these theories, nominal compliance with the AC 
reforms is unlikely to affect the likelihood of restatement.  
However, to the extent that changes to the AC yield a real improvement in 
competence and independence, one would expect to observe a decline in the 
likelihood of misstatement, regardless of changes in audit inputs, for two reasons. 
First, a more competent AC is more likely to detect opportunistic financial reporting 
by facilitating more effective internal controls. Second, the increase in competence 
and independence is expected to affect management’s assessment of the likelihood of 
detection of accounting manipulation – in particular, it is likely to increase the 
perception of manipulation detection ex ante. This increase in the perception of 
detection is expected to constrain management’s fraudulent financial reporting 
motives. Hence, the increase in competence and independence will reduce the 
likelihood of substandard reporting unconditionally, that is, regardless of the change 
in audit inputs. Our final hypothesis (stated in null) relates the reduction in the 
likelihood of restatement to the changes in AC attributes and the change in audit 
inputs: 
 
H3b: Irrespective of the change in audit inputs, the change in restatements 
from the pre- to the post-SOX period for non-compliant firms relative to 
compliant firms is not associated with the change in the competence and 
independence of the AC. 
 
3. Data and Univariate Analyses 
Director data for the period 2001-2006 come from RiskMetrics, a provider of 
corporate governance data. The data cover primarily S&P 1,500 firms and include a 
range of variables related to individual director characteristics such as age, tenure, 
committee membership, and independence. Using these data we compute for each 
firm-year the number of members in the AC and the proportion of independent 
directors among the AC members.  
We obtain data on individual directors’ financial expertise from their profiles in 
Corporate Library. The SEC defines as a financial expert a director who has 
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accounting financial expertise (as evidenced by experience as certified public 
accountant, auditor, chief financial officer, chief accounting officer, or controller) or 
non-accounting financial expertise (as evidenced by experience as chief executive 
officer or chairman). Based on this definition, we classify a director as a financial 
expert if the director’s bio describes a previous or current position as an accounting or 
non-accounting financial expert. Combining the financial expert data with the 
RiskMetrics data, we determine for each firm-year whether the AC includes at least 
one financial expert.9 
To identify firms affected by the AC reform, we require that each firm have, at 
a minimum, data in 2002 and 2005, resulting in an initial sample of 860 firms. 
Excluding firms in the financial sector (SIC codes 60-69) and utility sector (SIC codes 
49-50) reduces the sample to 672 firms. We next obtain a sample of non-compliant 
firms for each of the AC requirements – financial expert, three members, full 
independence – by evaluating whether firms met the requirements in 2002 and 2005. 
Specifically, the 'Financial Expert' non-compliant sample includes all firms that did 
not have a financial expert on the AC in 2002 but became compliant (i.e., added a 
financial expert to the AC) by 2005. Similarly, the 'Three-Member' and 
'Independence' non-compliant samples include firms that had less than three AC 
members and at least one non-independent AC director in 2002 but became compliant 
by 2005. The sample of compliant firms includes those that were compliant with all 
three requirements in both 2002 and 2005. We initially identify 136 firms that were 
non-compliant for any reason. Of these, 33 were non-compliant with the financial-
expert requirement, 65 with the three-members requirement, and 93 with the full-
independence requirement; 61 firms were non-compliant for any two requirements, 
and six were non-compliant for all three reasons.  
We obtain financial data from Compustat and CRSP, and audit-related 
information and restatements from the Audit Analytics database.10 To facilitate the 
analysis, we require non-missing data for audit fees, restatements, industry specialist 
auditors, and other control variables. These restrictions result in a final sample of non-
compliant firms consisting of 108 unique firms, where the Financial Expert, Three-
                                                 
9 An interesting issue is to examine whether the impact of general financial expertise differ from the 
impact of accounting expertise (Dhaliwal et al. 2010). However, in our sample all financial expert non-
compliant firms became compliant by adding an accounting expert. 
10 Audit Analytics includes restatements made by public companies to correct accounting that does not 
conform to GAAP. It excludes restatements due to changes in accounting principles, GAAP-to-GAAP 
changes, and changes in estimates. 
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Member, and Independence non-compliant samples comprise 26, 52, and 72 firms, 
respectively. Of these, 34 (4) firms were non-compliant for two (three) categories 
while 70 firms were non-compliant with a single category. Table 1 shows the 
distribution of non-compliant firm-years by category of non-compliance.11  
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
We examine the impact of changes in AC composition on audit inputs and 
restatements relative to a sample of compliant firms. We use a matched sample 
research design to control for the possibility that the non-compliant samples differ in 
audit risk and complexity. This research design also controls for concerns regarding 
time-series effects and potential correlated omitted variables. We match each non-
compliant firm-year with a firm-year from the compliant sample using propensity 
score matching. For each year we estimate the propensity score using proxies for size, 
audit risk, operational complexity, and audit engagement attributes, which are the 
main determinants of audit fees and restatements. Given the limited sample size, we 
use the most important proxies for audit fees and restatement determinants. In 
particular, we match based on size (natural log of total assets), profitability (return on 
assets), level of inventory and receivables relative to total assets, equity return 
volatility, number of business segments, and a Big N auditor indicator variable.12 
Untabulated tests indicate that the compliant and non-compliant firms within each of 
the three matched samples have similar attributes; none of the differences in the 
matching determinants is statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Table 2 reports the mean of the variables used in this study for each of the 
matched samples.13 The Appendix describes how the variables used in this study were 
computed. Although the mean of most variables is similar across the three samples, 
there are notable differences. The mean audit fee is about $2 million for the Financial 
Expert and Three-Member samples, but much higher – $3.75 million – for the 
                                                 
11 The relatively small number of non-compliant firms is consistent with the evidence in Zhang et al. 
(2007) which shows that most firms were complaint with SOX requirements when they came into 
effect. Nevertheless, our sample is large enough to allow drawing inferences about the causal impact of 
changes in AC attributes on audit input and financial reporting quality. Further, descriptive stats 
reported in Table 2 indicate that our sample does not include predominantly small firms. Untabulated 
results indicate that mean total assets of the firms in the matched samples is $5,555 million whereas 
mean total assets for the entire sample is $5,462 million. 
12 Ideally one conducts the match based on industry and year, but our limited sample size does not 
allow us to do so. In many industry-years, the number of observations is not sufficient to facilitate the 
matching methodology, and the resulting sample is significantly smaller.  
13 All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the impact of outliers. 
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Independence sample. One reason for the difference is firm size: while the Financial 
Expert and Three-Member sample firms are of comparable average size (mean total 
assets of $2,444 million and $3,099 million, respectively), the average firm size for 
the Independence sample is much larger (mean total assets of $7,549 million). Mean 
ISA is around 27-28% for the Financial Expert and Independence samples but lower 
for the Three-Member sample (20%). The likelihood of restatement is lowest for the 
Independence sample (0.175) and around 0.23 for the other samples. The 
Independence sample has the highest profitability (ROA) and likelihood of 
discontinued operations, and the lowest equity return volatility, book-to-market ratio, 
and likelihood of reporting a loss. Overall, Table 2 indicates that the three samples are 
not homogenous, providing further justification for the use of the matching research 
design. 
    (Insert Table 2 about here) 
Table 3 reports the mean audit fee, the proportion of firms appointing an ISA, 
and restated firm-years in the pre- and post-periods for the non-compliant and 
compliant firms in each of the samples. We define 2001 through 2003 as the pre 
period and 2004 through 2006 as the post period.14 Panel A reports the results for the 
Financial Expert non-compliant and matched compliant samples. The mean audit fee 
is similar in the pre period, and both samples experienced an economically and 
statistically significant (p-value<0.01) increase in audit fees in the post period relative 
to the pre period.15 Although the increase in audit fees for the two samples is not 
statistically different (p-value=0.308), the mean audit fee for the non-compliant 
sample is statistically lower (p-value<0.1) in the post period. The industry specialist 
auditor panel indicates that the mean ISA in the pre and post periods is similar for 
compliant and non-compliant firms. Although the mean ISA is higher (lower) in the 
post period for non-compliant (compliant) firms, the difference in the change is not 
statistically significant. The restatement panel shows that the mean likelihood of 
                                                 
14 Note that years here refer to fiscal years. RiskMetrics data, which we use to identify the compliant 
and non-compliant firms, report the board structure as of the annual meeting, and this board structure 
applies for the following year. For example, a firm with December 31 fiscal year-end would have an 
annual meeting to discuss the 2002 fiscal year in April 2003. Any changes to the board would then 
apply through April 2004. For our purposes, since the SOX requirements became mandatory in January 
2003, we use RiskMetrics data in 2002 to determine non-compliance. In addition, the first fiscal year 
that is affected by the new SOX requirements is fiscal year 2004, because any changes to the board 
following SOX took place during fiscal year 2003, and hence affected primarily 2004 onwards. Section 
5 reports sensitivity analyses related to the choice of pre- and post-periods. 
15  For example, the mean audit fee for the Financial Expert non-compliant firms increased from 
$1,070,120 in the pre-period to $2,795,720 in the post-period. 
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restatement for non-compliant firms is higher in the pre period in comparison to 
compliant firms (0.31 compared to 0.19) and the difference is statistically significant 
(p-value<0.1). Both groups experienced a reduction in the likelihood of restatement – 
the mean restatement in the post period is 0.24 and 0.18 for the non-compliant and 
compliant firms, respectively, but the change in the likelihood of restatement is not 
statistically significant. Finally, the difference in the likelihood of restatement 
between the two groups in the post period is not statistically significant.  
In sum, we find that the level of audit fees and the likelihood of appointing an 
ISA in the pre and post periods are similar for the Financial Expert compliant and 
non-compliant firms. However, there is some evidence of improvement in financial 
reporting quality: in comparison to compliant firms, non-compliant firms are more 
likely to restate in the pre period but as likely to restate in the post period. While this 
is consistent with the Financial Expert reform reducing substandard reporting without 
having an impact on audit inputs, we defer to our multivariate analysis to formally test 
our hypotheses. 
Panel B provides results for the Three-Member non-compliant and matched 
samples. Similar to the financial expert results, audit fees are similar across the two 
samples in both the pre and the post periods, and are significantly higher in the post 
period for both samples. The results for ISA indicate that while the mean ISA is not 
different for the compliant sample in the post period, it is significantly higher (p-
value<0.01) in the post period for the non-compliant sample. Further, the mean ISA 
for compliant firms is significantly greater in the pre period (p-value<0.1), but 
following the greater increase in ISA appointments by non-compliant firms, the 
difference in ISA appointments in the post period is not significant. The restatement 
panel shows that the likelihood of restatement in the pre and post periods is similar for 
compliant and non-compliant firms, and that the change in the likelihood of 
restatement for both samples from the pre to the post period is not statistically 
significant. Overall, Panel B indicates that the level of audit fees and the likelihood of 
restatement are similar for the Three-Member compliant and non-compliant samples, 
but the increase in ISA appointments is significantly higher for the non-compliant 
sample.    
Panel C presents the results for the Independence sample. Mean audit fees and 
ISA are comparable for the compliant and non-compliant samples in both the pre and 
the post periods, and the mean audit fee (mean ISA) for both is significantly higher 
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(not different) in the post period. The restatement panel shows that non-compliant 
firms were significantly more likely to restate in the pre period, but just as likely to 
restate in the post period, although the change in the likelihood of restatement is not 
statistically significant for both samples.  
Taken together, the univariate statistics indicate that audit fees are similar in the 
pre and post periods for the non-compliant and compliant samples, and that all firms 
experienced a significant increase in audit fees in the post period. The similar increase 
in audit fees is consistent with the requirements of SOX, primarily Section 404 on 
internal controls, which resulted in a significant increase in the effort and risk of the 
auditors of public firms. Mean ISA is significantly greater in the post period for the 
Three-Member non-compliant firms, indicating that these firms increased audit 
quality following the increase in the size of the AC. The results also indicate 
improvements in financial reporting quality for the Financial Expert and 
Independence non-compliant firms relative to their matched compliant firms; these 
non-compliant firms were more likely to restate in the pre period but as likely to 
restate in the post period. 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 This section reports the results of multivariate tests. We first discuss the 
impact of the AC reforms on audit inputs, in particular the level of audit fees and the 
likelihood of appointing an ISA, and then turn to the impact of the reforms on the 
likelihood of restatement.  
Following Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009), Guthrie et al. (2012), and 
Rubin and Segal (2012), we examine the impact of the AC reforms using the 
difference-in-difference approach for each matched sample of compliant and non-
compliant firms. Given that we use a matched sample design, we perform the analysis 
on differenced data within each matched pair. In particular, we compute the 
differences in the dependent and independent variables between non-compliant and 
matched compliant firm-years, and regress the difference in the dependent variable on 
the differenced independent variables. For example, to estimate the impact of the 
financial expert requirement on audit fees, we regress the difference in audit fees 
between the Financial Expert non-compliant and matched compliant firm-year on the 
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differences in the independent variables and a post period indicator variable. More 
specifically, we estimate the following model: 
 
 
Difference in Dependent Variableit=a0+a1 x Dummy(Post)t + [Difference in 
Controlsit]+Industry and Year Effectsi+εit,      (1) 
 
where the dependent variables are audit fees, the likelihood of appointing an ISA, and 
the likelihood of restatement. We estimate the regression separately for each of the 
non-compliant samples. The post indicator variable equals one if the period is 2004-
2006, and zero otherwise. In the above specification the coefficient a0 captures the 
conditional average difference (i.e., average difference after controlling for the 
determinants of the dependent variable) in the dependent variable between non-
compliant and compliant firms in the pre period, a1 captures the difference in the 
change in the dependent variable from the pre to the post periods between non-
compliant and compliant firms, and the sum of the coefficients a0 and a1 captures the 
conditional average difference in the dependent variable in the post period. The 
control variables include the variables used in the matching procedure. We include 
additional control variables depending on the analysis. The regressions are estimated 
using OLS or Logit; the standard errors are corrected for clustering by year.16 
 
4.1 Audit Fees 
 This section reports the results of the audit fee regressions. We examine 
whether audit fees are associated with the AC reforms, controlling for other factors 
shown to affect audit fees in the literature (e.g., Simunic 1980; Whisenant et al. 2003; 
Ashbaugh et al. 2003). Specifically, we control for firm size (assets), audit complexity 
(number of segments, foreign operations, discontinued operations, and reporting lag), 
audit risk (current ratio, level of inventory and receivables relative to assets, incidence 
of losses, operating volatility, book to market, and profitability), and audit 
engagement attributes (first year of engagement, Big N auditor, non-audit fees, and 
going concern opinion indicator).  
                                                 
16 We do not correct for clustering by firm because the observations used in our main regressions are in 
differenced form. Given this design, the time-series correlation within each cross-section is likely to be 
low because a non-compliant firm can be matched with a different compliant firm over time. In 
sensitivity analyses (Section 5.1) for the full sample of non-compliant firms, we report the results using 
clustering by firm and year.  
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Table 4 reports the audit fee regressions for each of the non-compliance 
samples. The results for the Financial Expert, Three-Member, and Independence 
samples are reported in columns 1 through 3, respectively. The post variable is 
positive and significant for the Financial Expert and Three-Member samples, 
indicating that the increase in audit fees from the pre to the post period for these non-
compliant firms is greater in comparison to the matched compliant firms. The 
coefficient on post for the Independence sample is negative but not statistically 
significant. The Financial Expert regression shows that the mean audit fee for non-
compliant firms is lower in the pre and post periods (p-value<0.05), although the 
difference in audit fees is smaller (in absolute terms) in the post period following the 
greater increase in audit fees for the non-compliant firms. In contrast, the mean audit 
fee for the Three-Member non-compliant firms is higher in both the pre and the post 
periods (p-value<0.01). Column 3 shows that there is no significant difference in 
audit fees between the Independence non-compliant and compliant firms in the pre 
and post periods.   
Overall, the results show that Financial Expert and Three-Member  
non-compliant firms experienced a greater increase in audit fees from the pre to the 
post period relative to their matched compliant firms. These results suggest that the 
addition of a financial expert to the AC and the increase in the number of AC 
members result in an increase in audit fees in an effort to improve external 
monitoring.   
The coefficients on the control variables are by and large consistent with the 
evidence in the literature. In particular, we find that the difference in audit fees is 
positively associated with differences in firm size, number of segments, foreign 
operations, the ratio of inventory and receivables to total assets, and the incidence of 
losses. The difference in audit fees is negatively associated with differences in 
profitability, the current ratio, and the incidence of initial audit engagements.  
 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
 
4.2 Industry Specialist Auditor 
The previous section indicates that meeting the requirements of a financial 
expert and a minimum of three members in the AC results in greater commitment to 
audit assurance through an increase in audit fees. In this section we replicate the 
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analysis using ISA appointments as another proxy for audit input.  
Table 5 presents the results from the ISA regressions. Following Abbott and 
Parker (2000) and Chen et al. (2005), we control for insider ownership, natural log of 
total sales, leverage, new financing, the proportion of non-audit fees relative to total 
fees paid to the auditor, and the proportion of reputable directors in the model. The 
regressions are estimated using Logit with year fixed effects.17,18 
The coefficient on the post dummy is positive and highly significant (p-
value<0.01) for the three samples, indicating that non-compliant firms experienced a 
greater increase in ISA appointments from the pre to the post period in comparison to 
their matched compliant firms. The negative and significant intercept in all three 
regressions implies that the mean ISA for non-compliant firms in the pre period is 
significantly smaller than that for their matched compliant firms. Further, F-tests at 
the bottom of the panel show that the mean ISA in the post period is still lower for the 
Three-Member and Independence non-compliant firms. Hence, with the exception of 
the Financial Expert non-compliant firms in the post period, we find that non-
compliant firms tend to have lower quality audit inputs, as proxied by ISA 
appointments, in both the pre and the post periods. However, these firms significantly 
increased the use of ISAs following the AC reform, thereby increasing the quality of 
audit inputs relative to matched compliant firms. 
Taken together, the results in this section suggest that the AC reform had a 
positive effect on the inputs for audit assurance. Non-compliant firms experienced 
greater increases in both audit fees and ISA appointments from the pre to the post 
period relative to compliant firms.19 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
 
                                                 
17 Under the difference-in-difference approach the dependent variable can take the values of 1, 0, and   
-1. We set the dependent variable to 1 if the value of ISA for a non-compliant firm is greater than that 
for its matched compliant firm and 0 otherwise. In other words, the dependent variable is 1 if a non-
compliant firm hires an ISA and its matched compliant firm does not, and 0 otherwise. In sensitivity 
analysis we do not change the values of the dependent variable and estimate the regression using 
ordered Logit. The results are very similar to those reported.  
18  Some observations have a perfect correlation between the industry dummy and the dependent 
variable. Hence, we report the results without controlling for industry. The results are similar when we 
control for industry (with a reduced sample).  
19 ISA typically charge higher fees, so one possible explanation for the increase in audit fees is more 
ISA appointments. When we control for ISA in the untabulated audit fees regressions, the results are 
qualitatively similar to those reported; Financial Expert and Three-Member non-compliant firms 
experienced a greater increase in audit fees from the pre to the post period relative to their matched 
compliant firms. 
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4.3 Likelihood of Financial Statement Restatement 
This section reports regression results on the impact of the AC reforms on the 
likelihood of restatement. We define the restatement indicator as 1 if the firm restated 
its financial reports for a given year and 0 otherwise. The regressions are estimated 
using Logit with year and industry fixed effects.20 The regressions include controls 
that are commonly used in the literature (e.g., Cao et al. 2011; DeFond et al. 2012). 
Table 6 presents the results of the regressions for each non-compliance 
category. The coefficient on the post dummy is negative and significant (p-
value<0.01) for the Financial Expert and Independence regressions, implying that the 
likelihood of restatement decreased more significantly in the post period for the 
respective non-compliant firms relative to their matched compliant firms. The 
coefficient on post in the Three-Member regression is negative but not statistically 
significant. Interestingly, the intercept in all three regressions is negative and 
significant (p-value<0.01), indicating that the likelihood of restatement in the pre 
period is lower for non-compliant firms. This result is surprising because it suggests 
that having a large, competent, and independent AC is not associated with higher 
financial reporting quality. Given the further decrease in the likelihood of restatement 
relative to compliant firms, non-compliant firms remain less likely to restate in the 
post period (p-value<0.01) as indicated by F-tests at the bottom of the panel.  
The signs on the control variables are broadly consistent with the findings in 
the extant literature, although the significance level varies across samples. 
Specifically, the difference in the likelihood of restatement is negatively associated 
with the differences in profitability and the incidence of mergers, and is positively 
associated with the differences in the number of segments and the issuance of large 
capital.  
Overall, we find that non-compliant firms experienced a greater improvement 
in financial reporting quality after becoming compliant with the AC reforms. The 
evidence also suggests that although these firms were non-compliant in the pre period, 
their likelihood of restatement was not higher in comparison to compliant firms.  
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
 
                                                 
20 Similar to the dependent variable in the ISA regressions, the dependent variable in these regressions 
takes the value of 1 if the non-compliant firm-year is restated and the compliant matched firm-year is 
not restated, and 0 otherwise. Again, we obtain similar results using ordered Logit. 
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4.4 Disentangling Changes in Governance from Changes in Audit Inputs 
 The previous sections show that relative to matched compliant firms, non-
compliant firms experienced a greater improvement in the inputs to audit assurance, 
i.e., larger increases in audit fees and ISA appointments, and with the exception of the 
Three-Member non-compliant firms a greater decrease in the likelihood of 
restatement. Hence, we find an overall improvement in both audit inputs and financial 
reporting quality from the pre to the post period for non-compliant firms. 
The improvement in financial reporting quality can therefore be attributed to 
two factors. First, a larger, more competent, and independent AC can positively 
impact financial reporting quality through its increased ability to detect manipulation 
on the one hand and deter manipulation through the greater likelihood of detection on 
the other hand. Second, improved audit assurance inputs, that is, greater audit effort 
and the hiring of an ISA, can lead to fewer restatements because any errors and 
manipulation in financial statements are more likely to be detected with enhanced 
audit input quality. 
To examine which of these two factors exerts a more dominant effect on the 
likelihood of restatement, we classify non-compliant firms into two groups based on 
the change in audit inputs. In the first analysis, we define ‘high change firms’ as those 
firms that switch their auditors from a non-ISA in the pre period to an ISA in the post 
period. In the second analysis, we define ‘high change firms’ as those firms for which 
the change in audit fees scaled by total assets from the pre to the post period is greater 
than the sample median change. We estimate the following model: 
Difference in Likelihood of Restatementit=a0 +a1xDummy(Post)t  +  
a2xDummy(High Change)t+ a3x Dummy(Post)txDummy(High Change)t+ 
[Difference in Controlsit]+ Industry and Year Effectsi+εit,   (2) 
 
where the High Change indicator equals 1 if the firm is classified as a 'high change 
firm' and 0 otherwise. In the above specification, the coefficient a1 measures the 
unconditional (relative to the change in audit inputs) change in the likelihood of 
restatement from the pre to the post period for the non-compliant firms relative to the 
matched compliant firms, and a3 captures the incremental impact of a high change in 
audit inputs on the likelihood of restatement. Hence, a1 captures the impact of the AC 
reform on the likelihood of restatement irrespective of the change in audit inputs, a3 
captures the incremental impact of the change in audit inputs in the post period, and 
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a0+a1 (a0+a1+a3) captures the conditional difference in the likelihood of 
restatement in the post period for low change firms (high change firms). We estimate 
the model using Logit; the standard errors correct for clustering by year. 
 Table 7, Panel A reports the results of regressions where the model is 
estimated conditional on the change to an ISA. Specifically, the High Change dummy 
takes the value of 1 if a non-compliant firm did not hire an ISA in the pre period and 
switched to an ISA in the post period, and 0 otherwise. Similar to the results in Table 
6, the coefficient on the post dummy (a1) is negative and significant for the Financial 
Expert and Independence samples. The coefficient on the interaction between the 
High Change and post period dummies (a3) is not significant for any of the non-
compliance category regressions. These results therefore imply that the decrease in 
the likelihood of restatement for the Financial Expert and Independence non-
compliant firms is independent of the impact of switching from a non-ISA to an ISA; 
these non-compliant firms experienced an improvement in financial reporting quality 
regardless of whether they switched to an ISA. Further, the coefficient on the High 
Change dummy (a2) is not significantly different from zero, indicating that changing 
to an ISA does not affect the likelihood of restatement for our sample firms.  
Table 7, Panel B presents the results of regressions where a high change in 
audit input is based on the change in audit fees. Here, the High Change dummy takes 
the value of 1 if the change in audit fees scaled by total assets from the pre to the post 
period is greater than the sample median change. The results are similar to those 
reported in Panel A. The coefficient on the post period dummy in the Financial Expert 
column is negative and significant, whereas the coefficient on the interaction between 
the High Change and post dummies is not significant in any of the regressions. Again, 
these results imply that the decrease in the likelihood of restatement applies to all 
Financial Expert non-compliant firms, regardless of the change in audit fees. The 
result for the Independence sample is weaker and under this specification we find no 
change in the likelihood of restatement. 
In sum, the results of Table 7 suggest that the change in the likelihood of 
restatement can be attributed to the change in the competence and independence of 
the AC, rather than to the change in audit inputs experienced by these firms. Although 
the Financial Expert and Independence non-compliant firms exhibit greater increases 
in audit fees and ISA appointments relative to their matched compliant firms, the 
decrease in restatements appears to not be related to the change in audit inputs. 
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Rather, the decrease in restatements applies to all non-compliant firms independent of 
the change in audit inputs. Hence, the decrease in the likelihood of restatement can be 
attributed to improved competence and independence of ACs. These improvements 
are likely to affect the ability of ACs to detect manipulation on the one hand, and to 
deter management from manipulation on the other hand, thereby reducing the overall 
likelihood of restatement. 
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
 
5. Sensitivity Analyses 
5.1 Full Sample 
In this section we report the results when we replicate the analyses using all 
available compliant firm observations (1,913 firms-years) without using the matching 
procedure. The non-compliant sample is identical to the sample used in the matching 
analysis. We estimate the following model for each of the samples: 
 
Dependent Variableit=a0 +a1×Dummy(Non-compliant)i +a2×Dummy(Post)t 
+a3×Dummy(Non-compliant)i×Dummy(Post)i + [Controlsit] + Industry and 
Year Effects+ 𝜀𝜀it,           (3) 
 
where the dependent variable is either the natural log of audit fees, the ISA indicator, 
or the restatement indicator. In the above specification, a1 captures the average of the 
dependent variable for non-compliant firms relative to the compliant sample, a2 
captures the average dependent variable in the post period, and a3 captures the 
incremental change in the dependent variable for non-compliant firms in the post 
period relative to compliant firms. The regressions are estimated either using OLS or 
Logit, and the standard errors correct for clustering by firm and year. To conserve 
space, in the tables we report the main variables of interest only. 
Table 8, Panel A reports the results of the audit fee regressions. The 
coefficient on the post dummy (a2) is positive and significant (p-value<0.01) in all 
regressions, indicating that both compliant and non-compliant firms experienced a 
significant increase in audit fees in the post period. The results for the Financial 
Expert sample (column 1) show a positive coefficient on the interaction between the 
non-compliant and post dummies, which implies that the change in audit fees for the 
Financial Expert non-compliant firms is significantly greater compared to the 
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compliant firms. The results also show that the audit fees of the non-compliant firms 
are significantly lower (p-value<0.01) in the pre period, but an F-test (untabulated) 
shows that following the greater increase in the post period, audit fees of Financial 
Expert non-compliant firms are comparable to those of compliant firms in the post 
period. Similar to Financial Expert non-compliant firms, Three-Member non-
compliant firms (column 2) experienced a significantly greater (p-value<0.01) 
increase in audit fees in the post period. However, the level of audit fees is similar to 
compliant firms both in the pre and post periods. Similar to the results of Table 4, we 
find that the increase in audit fees and the level of audit fees in the pre and post period 
for Independence non-compliant firms are not significantly different from those for 
compliant firms (column 3).  
Table 8, Panel B presents the results of ISA regressions. With the exception of 
the Independence regression, the post indicator variable is not different from 0, 
indicating that the likelihood of ISA in the post period is similar to that in the pre 
period. The Independence regression (column 3) shows that the likelihood of an ISA 
in the post period is significantly lower (p-value<0.05). However, the coefficient on 
the interaction between the non-compliant and post dummies is positive and 
significant for all three regressions, indicating that non-compliant firms are more 
likely to appoint an ISA in the post period. The non-compliant dummy for the Three-
Member sample is negative and significant (p-value<0.05), implying that these non-
compliant firms are less likely to hire an ISA in the pre period. F-tests (untabulated) 
show that the likelihood of appointing an ISA in the post period for each non-
compliant sample is similar to that of the compliant sample.  
Overall, the results indicate that non-compliant firms experienced a greater 
improvement in the commitment to audit assurance in the post period. The increases 
in audit fees and ISA appointments are significantly greater for non-compliant firms 
relative to compliant firms. Hence, these results are similar to those reported using the 
matching design. 
Table 8, Panel C reports the results of the restatement regressions.The results 
suggest that the likelihood of restatement in the post period is significantly lower for 
all sample firms, and that Financial Expert and Three-Member non-compliant firms 
are more likely to restate on average. The coefficient on the interaction between the 
non-compliant and post indicators is negative in all three regressions but only 
marginally significant with one-tailed test in the Financial Expert regression.  
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Panels D and E of Table 8 report the results of restatement regressions where 
we control for a 'high change' in audit fees and ISA appointment, respectively. Panel 
D shows that Financial Expert non-compliant firms experienced a significant decrease 
in restatements (p-value<0.05) after we control for a high change in audit fees. 
However, Panel E indicates that the significant decrease in restatements for the 
Financial Expert non-compliant firms is conditional upon whether those firms 
switched their auditors to an ISA.  
Taken together, the full-sample results indicate that non-compliant firms 
exhibit greater increases in audit fees and ISA appointments in the post period. We 
find some evidence that Financial Expert non-compliant firms experienced a greater 
decrease in restatements in the post period. These results are largely consistent with 
those of our matching analyses. 
(Insert Table 8 about here) 
 
5.2 Excluding Transition Years (2003-2004) 
 The corporate scandals of 2001 and 2002 resulted in increased scrutiny from 
investors. For example, firms were subject to scoring schemes that evaluated firm 
governance. Firms that were not compliant with any of the AC reforms were likely to 
face stronger scrutiny from investors because of their perceivably weaker governance, 
especially after the publication of the SOX report in mid-2002. Hence, these firms 
would have been expected to invest more in audit assurance and increase financial 
reporting quality even before the new regulation came into effect. However, 
untabulated results indicate that most non-compliant firms became compliant in fiscal 
year 2004. It is therefore possible that the impact of the AC reforms on audit inputs 
and financial reporting quality occurred only after fiscal year 2004. Hence, because 
2003 and 2004 can be considered transition years, we repeat the analysis excluding 
observations in these two years and examine whether the results are sensitive to the 
inclusion of this transition period. 
 The results presented in Table 9 are very similar to those reported earlier. 
Specifically, the Financial Expert and Three-Member non-compliant firms 
experienced greater increases in audit fees and ISA appointments in the post period 
relative to their matched compliant firms. All three non-compliant samples of firms 
experienced a greater decrease in restatements irrespective of the change in audit fees 
or ISA appointments. We also find that Financial Expert non-compliant firms that 
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switched to an ISA experienced an even greater decrease in restatements, whereas 
Three-Member non-compliant firms that switched to an ISA experienced an increase 
in restatements. Overall, we conclude that the results are not sensitive to the exclusion 
of the transition years. 
(Insert Table 9 about here) 
 
5.3 Alternative Definition of Restatement Indicator  
 In this section, we examine whether the results of restatement analyses are 
robust to alternative definitions of restatement indicator. First, we exclude income-
increasing and income-neutral restatements from the definition of the restatement 
indicator and set the indicator variable to 1 only if earnings for a given year are 
subsequently restated downward (i.e., “income-decreasing” restatements), and 0 
otherwise. We perform this robustness check because income-decreasing restatements 
are more likely to be associated with opportunistic reporting and thus harm 
shareholders relatively more than income-neutral or income-increasing restatements 
(Palmrose et al. 2004; Srinivasan 2005; Agrawal and Cooper 2009). Table 10 presents 
the regression results. Panel A shows that the decrease in income-decreasing 
restatements in the post period is significantly greater for all non-compliant firms. 
Panels B indicates that the decrease in restatements is not related to the change in 
audit fees. Panel C shows that all non-compliant firms experienced a significant 
decrease in restatements regardless of whether they switched to an ISA. Overall, these 
results are consistent with the results using all restatements.  
(Insert Table 10 about here) 
 Second, we examine whether the results are sensitive to the types of 
restatements. Our main analysis includes all types of restatements in Audit Analytics: 
(1) Accounting rule application failure; (2) financial fraud, irregularities, and 
misrepresentations; (3) errors in accounting and clerical applications; and (4) other 
significant issues. Most restatements in our sample belong to the first category while 
there are very few cases for the rest categories. Our untabulated analysis indicates that 
the results are qualitatively similar when we use only the first category or the 
combination of the rest categories for the definition of the restatement indicator.   
 
5.4 Alternative Definition of Industry Specialist Auditor  
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We next examine whether our results are sensitive to alternative measures of 
ISA. First, following the definition of Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) and Reichelt and 
Wang (2010), we define an ISA as an auditor who has the largest market share in a 
two-digit SIC industry both at the city and at the national level and whose market 
share is at least 10 percentage points higher than the second largest auditor. This 
measure is based on the idea that the largest auditor with a sufficiently higher market 
share than the second largest auditor is more likely to be dominant in the industry. 
Second, following Neal and Riley (2004) and Lim and Tan (2008), an ISA is defined 
as an auditor who has a market share greater than 24% for 2001 and 30% for the years 
from 2002 to 2006 both at the city and at the national level. This definition takes into 
consideration the demise of Andersen in 2002 and assumes that an auditor’s expertise 
is sufficiently high if its industry market share is higher than a certain percentage.  
 The results (untabulated) using these two alternative measures of ISA are very 
similar to those reported. Specifically, we continue to find that all non-compliant 
firms experience a greater increase in the appointment of an ISA in the post period. 
 
5.5 Controlling for Internal Control Weakness  
Our main analysis does not control for the effect of internal control weakness 
because such data are unavailable for the pre-SOX period and our difference-in-
difference approach is expected to reduce the effect. To more carefully consider the 
effect, we first examine the proportion of firms who received an adverse audit opinion 
on internal control over financial reporting under SOX Section 404 in the post-SOX 
period among non-compliant and compliant sample firms. Our untabulated analysis 
finds that the difference in the proportion between non-compliant and compliant 
sample firms for all three categories of non-compliance is insignificant at 
conventional levels, regardless of whether average opinion in the post-SOX period or 
the initial year opinion is examined. Second, we check the sensitivity of our results 
after including a variable to capture firms’ internal control weakness to each 
regression model. For this purpose, we assume that audit opinions on internal control 
in the pre-SOX period are identical to that of the initial year in the post-SOX period. 
Untabulated results indicate that our variable of internal control weakness is 
positively related to audit fees and restatements and is negatively related with the 
appointment of ISA, consistent with findings of prior studies. More importantly, we 
find that our results are robust to the inclusion of the variable of internal control 
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weakness.  
 
5.6 Measuring Financial Reporting Quality Using Accrual-based Measures  
 We examine whether our results are robust when we use several accrual-based 
measures as alternative proxies for financial reporting quality. Specifically, we 
employ (1) accrual quality measure developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002); (2) 
abnormal accruals obtained from the Modified Jones (1991) model; (3) abnormal 
accruals obtained from the Ball and Shivakumar (2006) model which controls for the 
asymmetric timeliness of accruals in recognizing economic gain and loss; and (4) 
abnormal accruals adjusted for firm performance using the Kothari et al.’s (2005) 
procedure. The results are by and large consistent with those reported. In particular, 
we observe a general significant decrease in the level of abnormal accruals and the 
improvement in accrual quality across the non-compliant samples. In addition, in 
most cases the decrease and improvement are independent from the change in audit 
inputs.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 Following the enactment of SOX in 2002, the SEC and major stock exchanges 
issued rulings requiring audit committees to include a minimum of three directors, all 
of whom are independent, and at least one financial expert. These changes to the 
composition of the AC provide a natural experimental setting to investigate the 
impact of changes in the committee’s competence and independence on audit inputs 
and financial reporting quality.  
 Using a difference-in-difference approach for a sample of firms that were not 
compliant with any of the requirements together with a matched sample of compliant 
firms, we find that the changes in AC governance are associated with improvements 
in both audit inputs and financial reporting quality. Specifically, firms directly 
affected by the new requirements experienced a significantly greater increase in audit 
fees and ISA appointments in comparison to matched firms not affected by the 
regulatory changes. These results imply that the increase in competence and 
independence of ACs resulted in greater commitment to audit assurance.  
 We also find that these firms experienced a significantly greater decrease in 
the likelihood of restatement, consistent with evidence in the literature on the relation 
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between the competence and independence of ACs and financial reporting quality. 
Furthermore, we find that the decrease in restatements is independent of the change in 
audit inputs. This evidence is consistent with a more competent and independent AC 
being better able to detect misstatements or deter potential management manipulation 
by enhancing the ex-ante probability of detection.   
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
POST An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 in 2004 through 2006, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Natural Log of Audit 
Fees 
The natural logarithm of audit fees in thousand dollars. 
 
 
Industry Specialist 
Auditor 
An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if an auditor has the largest 
market share in a two-digit SIC industry in a particular year both at the city 
level and at the national level, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Restatement Indicator An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the financial statements for a 
given year are restated, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Natural Log of Total 
Assets 
 
The natural logarithm of total assets (COMPUSTAT data item AT). 
 
Return on Assets Operating income (COMPUSTAT data item OIADP) divided by total 
assets (COMPUSTAT data item AT). 
 
Inventories and 
Receivables to Total 
Assets 
Inventory (COMPUSTAT data item INVT) plus accounts receivable 
(COMPUSTAT data item RECT), divided by total assets (COMPUSTAT 
data item AT). 
 
Segments The square root of the number of segments provided by the COMPUSTAT 
segment database. 
 
Return Volatility The variance of the residual from the market model based on daily returns 
during the fiscal year, multiplied by 100. 
 
Natural Log of Non-
Audit Fees 
The natural logarithm of total non-audit fees in thousand dollars. 
Current Ratio Current assets (COMPUSTAT data item ACT) divided by current 
liabilities (COMPUSTAT data item LCT). 
 
Book-to-Market Book-to-market ratio, measured as the book value of equity 
(COMPUSTAT data item CEQ) divided by the market value of equity 
(COMPUSTAT data item CSHO multiplied by PRCC_F). This variable is 
winsorized at 0 and 4. 
 
Reporting Lag Number of days from the fiscal year-end to the earnings announcement 
date (COMPUSTAT data item RDQ). 
 
Insider Ownership Percentage of shares owned by insiders at the end of the current year, 
where insiders include corporate executives and directors. 
 
Natural Log of Sales The natural logarithm of sales (COMPUSTAT data item SALE). 
 
Leverage Total liabilities (COMPUSTAT data item LT) divided by total assets 
(COMPUSTAT data item AT). 
 
Capital Issuance The amount of stock and debt issuance (COMPUSTAT data item SSTK 
plus COMPUSTAT data item DLTIS), divided by total assets 
(COMPUSTAT data item AT). 
 
Reputable Directors The number of board directors with at least one additional board, divided 
by the total number of directors on the board. 
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Natural Log of Non-
audit Fees to Natural 
Log of Total Fees 
 
The natural logarithm of non-audit fees divided by the natural logarithm of 
total fees paid to the auditor in the fiscal year. 
 
Big N Indicator An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the auditor is a member of 
the Big 4 or 5 auditors, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Foreign Operations 
Indicator 
An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has foreign 
operations in the fiscal year (based on COMPUSTAT data item FCA), and 
0 otherwise. 
 
Loss Indicator An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm reports negative net 
income (COMPUSTAT data item NI) in the previous two fiscal years, and 
0 otherwise. 
 
Initial Auditor 
Engagement Indicator 
 
An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the audit engagement is in 
either the first or the second year, and 0 otherwise. 
Going Concern 
Indicator 
An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm receives a going-
concern modified audit opinion in either the current or the previous fiscal 
year, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Discontinued 
Operations Indicator 
An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm reports 
extraordinary items or discontinued operations (based on COMPUSTAT 
data item XIDO), and 0 otherwise. 
 
Merger Indicator An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm engages in a merger 
or acquisition (based on COMPUSTAT data item SALE_FN) during the 
year, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Negative ROA 
Indicator 
An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if ROA is negative, and 0 
otherwise.  
 
Large Capital 
Issuance Indicator 
An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the sum of equity and debt 
issued (COMPUSTAT data item SSTK plus COMPUSTAT data item 
DLTIS) during the past three years is more than five percent of total assets 
(COMPUSTAT data item AT), and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 1: Sample Distribution 
 
    Number of firm-year observations 
Non-Compliance 
Category 
Number of 
firms  2001 – 2003 2004 - 2006 Total 
Financial Expert 26  70 78 148 
Three-Member 52  141 156 297 
Independence 72  197 214 411 
Any Reason  150  408 448 856 
Unique Firm 108  296 322 618 
      
Non-compliant with      
     All three categories 4  11 12 23 
     Only two categories 34  90 102 192 
     Only one category 70  195 208 403 
This table shows the distribution of non-compliant firms by the three categories of non-compliance: (i) financial 
expertise, (ii) three members, and (iii) independence.  The first column shows the number of firms, and the second 
and third columns show the number of firm-year observations in the pre- and post-regulation periods (i.e., from 
2001 to 2003 and from 2004 to 2006, respectively). The Financial Expert category includes all firms that were not 
compliant with the requirement of having at least one financial expert on the AC in 2002 but became compliant by 
2005. The Three-Member and Independence categories include all firms that were not compliant with the 
requirement of having at least three members and all independent directors on the AC, respectively, in 2002 and 
became compliant by 2005.  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
Financial 
Expert 
(N= 296)  
Three-Member 
(N=594)  
Independence 
(N=822) 
Variable Mean  Mean  Mean 
Audit Fees (in thousands) 2,063  2,139  3,752 
Industry Specialist Auditor 0.267  0.202  0.281 
Restatement Indicator 0.230  0.236  0.175 
Total Assets (in millions) 2,444  3,099  7,549 
Return on Assets 0.085  0.088  0.102 
Inventories and Receivables to 
Total Assets 0.253  0.248  0.246 
Segments 1.582  1.546  1.591 
Return volatility 0.067  0.061  0.047 
Natural Log of Non-Audit Fees 5.842  5.884  6.585 
Current Ratio 2.706  2.786  2.399 
Book-to-Market 0.459  0.441  0.397 
Reporting Lag 41.324  39.082  35.048 
Insider Ownership (%) 5.170  5.263  4.417 
Natural Log of Sales 6.962  7.023  7.781 
Leverage 0.458  0.449  0.483 
Capital Issuance 0.092  0.086  0.084 
Reputable Directors 0.212  0.224  0.275 
Natural Log of Non-Audit Fees to 
Natural Log of Total Fees 0.784  0.777  0.811 
Big N Indicator 0.973  0.965  0.982 
Foreign Operations Indicator 0.280  0.367  0.349 
Loss Indicator 0.277  0.300  0.230 
Initial Auditor Engagement 
Indicator 0.152  0.150  0.119 
Going Concern Indicator 0.003  0.005  0.005 
Discontinued Operations Indicator 0.267  0.261  0.303 
Merger Indicator 0.270  0.269  0.313 
Negative ROA indicator 0.125  0.109  0.061 
Large Capital Issuance Indicator 0.861  0.800  0.788 
This table reports the means of the main variables used in this study for each of the three samples of non-compliant 
firms along with their matched compliant firm-year over the period from 2001 to 2006. Each non-compliant firm-
year is matched with a firm-year from the compliant sample based on the closest propensity score estimated using 
size (natural log of total assets), profitability (return on assets), level of inventories and receivables relative to total 
assets, equity return volatility, number of business segments, and an indicator variable for a Big N auditor. 
Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix.   
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Table 3: Univariate Difference-in-Difference Analysis 
 
Panel A: Financial Expert  
 
(A) Audit Fees 
  Pre Post Diff (Pre vs. Post) p-value 
Compliant 6.3786 7.7088 1.3302 <.0001 
Non-Compliant 6.3507 7.4611 1.1104 <.0001 
Diff (Non_Compliant-Compliant) -0.0278 -0.2477 -0.2198 0.3078 
p-value 0.8587 0.0953   
 
 
(B) Industry Specialist Auditor 
  Pre Post Diff (Pre vs. Post) p-value 
Compliant 0.2857 0.2564 -0.0293 0.6888 
Non-Compliant 0.2143 0.3077 0.0934 0.2023 
Diff (Non_Compliant-Compliant) -0.0714 0.0513 0.1227 0.2362 
p-value 0.3420 0.4713   
 
 
(C) Restatement  
  Pre Post Diff (Pre vs. Post) p-value 
Compliant 0.1857 0.1795 -0.0062 0.9283 
Non-Compliant 0.3143 0.2436 -0.0707 0.3076 
Diff (Non_Compliant-Compliant) 0.1286 0.0641 -0.0645 0.5103 
p-value 0.0712 0.3414   
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Panel B: Three-Member 
 
(A) Audit Fees 
  Pre Post Diff (Pre vs. Post) p-value 
Compliant 6.4915 7.5119 1.0204 <.0001 
Non-Compliant 6.5436 7.6557 1.1121 <.0001 
Diff (Non_Compliant-Compliant) 0.0522 0.1438 0.0917 0.5628 
p-value 0.6496 0.1878     
 
 
(B) Industry Specialist Auditor 
  Pre Post Diff (Pre vs. Post) p-value 
Compliant 0.1986 0.2244 0.0258 0.5786 
Non-Compliant 0.1135 0.2628 0.1493 0.0014 
Diff (Non_Compliant-Compliant) -0.0851 0.0385 0.1236 0.0601 
p-value 0.0739 0.3951     
 
 
(C) Restatement  
  Pre Post Diff (Pre vs. Post) p-value 
Compliant 0.2270 0.1987 -0.0282 0.5677 
Non-Compliant 0.2766 0.2436 -0.0330 0.5041 
Diff (Non_Compliant-Compliant) 0.0496 0.0449 -0.0048 0.9455 
p-value 0.3270 0.3514     
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Panel C: Independence  
 
(A) Audit Fees 
  Pre Post Diff (Pre vs. Post) p-value 
Compliant 7.0784 8.0209 0.9425 <.0001 
Non-Compliant 7.0518 8.0209 0.9691 <.0001 
Diff (Non_Compliant-Compliant) -0.0266 0.0000 0.0266 0.8604 
p-value 0.8075 0.9999     
 
 
(B) Industry Specialist Auditor 
  Pre Post Diff (Pre vs. Post) p-value 
Compliant 0.2690 0.2710 0.0020 0.9643 
Non-Compliant 0.2690 0.3131 0.0440 0.3220 
Diff (Non_Compliant-Compliant) 0.0000 0.0421 0.0421 0.5037 
p-value 1.0000 0.3342     
 
 
(C) Restatement  
  Pre Post Diff (Pre vs. Post) p-value 
Compliant 0.1320 0.1542 0.0222 0.5533 
Non-Compliant 0.2183 0.1963 -0.0220 0.5571 
Diff (Non_Compliant-Compliant) 0.0863 0.0421 -0.0442 0.4041 
p-value 0.0243 0.2521     
This table presents the results of difference-in-difference analyses between non-compliant firms and their matched 
compliant firms from the pre- to the post-regulation period related to (i) the natural log of audit fees, (ii) the 
likelihood of using an ISA, and (ii) the likelihood of restatement. Pre (Post) is the period from 2001 to 2003 (2004 
to 2006). Panels A, B, and C report the results for the Financial Expert, Three-Member, and Independence sample, 
respectively.  
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Table 4: Audit Fees Regressions 
 
  
Variables 
 Pred. 
Sign 
  Financial Expert  Three-Member  Independence 
  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
POST a1 ?   0.249** 0.036  0.055** 0.028  -0.066 0.123 
Natural Log of Total Assets  +  0.531*** 0.000  0.554*** 0.000  0.446*** 0.000 
Return on Assets  -  -0.576 0.593  -1.191 0.101  -2.062*** 0.001 
Inventories and Receivables to Total Assets  +  1.448*** 0.003  0.219 0.162  0.894*** 0.009 
Big N Indicator  +  -0.023 0.962  -0.133 0.361  -0.060 0.669 
Segments  +  0.001 0.992  0.269*** 0.005  0.175* 0.053 
Return Volatility  +  -0.096 0.890  -1.350 0.206  0.027 0.975 
Natural Log of Non-Audit Fees  +  0.180* 0.058  0.132*** 0.001  0.145*** 0.003 
Current Ratio  -  -0.019 0.475  -0.087*** 0.001  -0.094** 0.011 
Foreign Operations Indicator  +  0.196 0.198  0.235** 0.021  0.214 0.034 
Loss Indicator  +  0.103 0.602  0.116 0.281  -0.006 0.896 
Book-to-Market  -  0.064 0.411  -0.081 0.367  -0.620*** 0.005 
Discontinued Operations Indicator  +  0.065 0.481  0.097 0.129  0.091 0.156 
Initial Auditor Engagement Indicator  -  0.062 0.741  -0.100** 0.044  -0.090 0.160 
Going Concern Indicator  +  -0.140 0.728  0.086 0.802  -0.463*** 0.002 
Reporting Lag  +  0.007 0.133  0.008*** 0.005  0.003 0.163 
Intercept a0 ?  -0.909** 0.031  0.828*** 0.005  0.318 0.216 
            
Year Fixed Effects    Included  Included  Included 
Industry Fixed Effects    Included  Included  Included 
            
F-test:a0 + a1 = 0  ?   -0.660** 0.040  0.883*** 0.005  0.252 0.353 
            
N    148  297  411 
R2     0.757  0.737  0.635 
This table presents results of OLS regressions of the difference in the natural log of audit fees between the non-compliant firm-year and its matched compliant firm-year. The Financial Expert 
column reports the regression results based on the sample of firms that were non-compliant with the requirement of having a financial expert in the AC. The Three-Member and Independence 
columns report the regression results based on the sample of firms that were not compliant with the requirement of having at least three members and all independent directors on the AC, 
respectively. With the exception of the POST indicator, the independent variables in the regressions are computed as the difference between the non-compliant observation and the matched 
compliant observation. For example, Natural Log of Total Assets is the difference between the natural log of the total assets for the non-compliant observation and the natural log of the total 
assets for the compliant observation. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. p-values are 
based on standard errors adjusted for clustering by year.
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Table 5: Industry Specialist Regressions 
 
  
Variables 
 Pred. 
Sign 
  Financial Expert  Three-Member  Independence 
  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
POST a1 ?   0.500*** 0.001   0.482*** 0.000   0.269*** 0.000 
Natural Log of Total Assets  +  0.454 0.424  -0.112 0.747  0.593*** 0.003 
Return on Assets  -  -3.942 0.173  -2.418 0.186  -0.147 0.837 
Inventories and Receivables to Total Assets  +  2.342 0.200  0.260 0.867  0.324 0.757 
Big N Indicator  +  0.470 0.257  -0.139 0.653  0.650 0.116 
Segments  +  -0.058 0.878  0.504*** 0.000  0.560*** 0.000 
Return Volatility  +  0.901 0.912  -2.491 0.494  -3.692 0.114 
Insider Ownership  +  0.021 0.209  -0.023 0.181  0.000 0.995 
Natural Log of Sales  -  -0.216 0.633  0.164 0.687  -0.193 0.259 
Leverage  +  -1.291** 0.029  -1.145 0.346  0.519 0.227 
Capital Issuance  +  3.652** 0.017  0.590 0.662  -1.334*** 0.008 
Reputable Directors  -  -1.544 0.198  1.388 0.127  0.113 0.732 
Natural Log of Non-audit Fees to Natural Log of Total Fees  +  3.529 0.121  0.187 0.729  -0.832** 0.026 
Intercept a0 ?  -2.641*** 0.000  -2.146*** 0.000  -1.651*** 0.000 
            
Year Fixed Effects    Included  Included  Included 
Industry Fixed Effects    No  No  No 
            
F-test:a0 + a1 = 0  ?   -2.141 0.563   -1.664*** 0.000   -1.382*** 0.000 
            
N    148  297  411 
Pseudo R2     0.164  0.090  0.048 
This table presents results from Logit regressions of the difference in the likelihood of using an ISA between non-compliant and compliant firms. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if 
the non-compliant firm uses an ISA and the compliant firm does not use an ISA, and 0 otherwise. With the exception of the POST indicator, the independent variables in the regressions are 
computed as the difference between the non-compliant observation and the matched compliant observation. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. P-values are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering by year. 
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Table 6: Restatement Analysis 
 
  
Variables 
 Pred. 
Sign 
  Financial Expert  Three-Member  Independence 
  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
POST a1 ?   -1.199*** 0.000  -0.102 0.327  -0.158*** 0.001 
Natural Log of Total Assets  ?  0.164 0.338  -0.171 0.276  -0.103 0.464 
Return on Assets  -  -5.834** 0.017  -2.133 0.365  -1.509 0.421 
Inventories and Receivables to Total Assets  +  -0.528 0.561  1.119 0.184  0.921 0.239 
Big N Indicator  -  -0.903 0.266  1.067 0.233  1.148 0.106 
Segments  +  0.845** 0.040  0.035 0.881  -0.138 0.214 
Return Volatility  +  2.148 0.386  -1.132 0.727  3.290 0.196 
Merger Indicator  +  -0.163 0.603  -0.193 0.499  -0.641** 0.035 
Large Capital Issuance Indicator  +  0.974 0.141  0.424* 0.068  0.025 0.860 
Foreign Operations Indicator  +  0.416 0.112  0.059 0.799  -0.241 0.135 
Book-to-Market  ?  0.095 0.824  0.445 0.331  1.717** 0.011 
Leverage  +  -0.006 0.997  0.255 0.488  0.188 0.675 
Negative ROA Indicator  +  -0.773 0.250  -0.813* 0.080  -0.891 0.116 
Natural Log of Non-Audit Fees  ?  -0.286 0.120  0.093 0.295  -0.099 0.554 
Intercept a0 ?  -1.123*** 0.000  -1.233*** 0.000  -1.305*** 0.000 
            
Year Fixed Effects    Included  Included  Included 
Industry Fixed Effects    No  No  No 
            
F-test:a0 + a1 = 0  ?   -2.322*** 0.000  -1.335*** 0.000  -1.463*** 0.000 
            
N    148  297  411 
Pseudo R2     0.139  0.063  0.098 
This table presents results from Logit regressions of the difference in the likelihood of restatement between non-compliant and compliant firms. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the 
non-compliant firm-year is restated and the compliant firm-year is not restated, and 0 otherwise. With the exception of the POST indicator, the independent variables in the regressions are 
computed as the difference between the non-compliant observation and the matched compliant observation. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. P-values are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering by year. 
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Table 7: Restatement Analysis Conditional on Change in Audit Inputs 
 
Panel A. Conditional on Change to Industry Specialist Auditor 
 
  
Variables 
 Pred. 
Sign 
  Financial Expert  Three-Member  Independence 
  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
POST a1 ?   
 
-0.964*** 0.005 
 
 
-0.247 0.200 
 
 
-0.227*** 0.008 
High Change a2 ? 0.500 0.163 -0.491 0.461 -0.336 0.638 
POST*High Change a3 ? -1.116 0.202 0.709 0.231 0.507 0.483 
Natural Log of Total Assets  ?  0.166 0.338  -0.166 0.289  -0.095 0.476 
Return on Assets  -  -5.435** 0.022  -2.163 0.362  -1.403 0.433 
Inventories and Receivables to Total Assets  +  -0.475 0.599  1.064 0.269  0.907 0.245 
Big N Indicator  -  -0.741 0.369  1.059 0.249  1.155 0.102 
Segments  +  0.915** 0.022  0.036 0.877  -0.132 0.271 
Return Volatility  +  2.418 0.352  -0.987 0.752  3.466 0.158 
Merger Indicator  +  -0.142 0.665  -0.203 0.469  -0.643** 0.034 
Large Capital Issuance Indicator  +  0.985 0.169  0.423* 0.072  0.023 0.867 
Foreign Operations Indicator  +  0.415* 0.094  0.060 0.800  -0.235 0.139 
Book-to-Market  ?  0.125 0.769  0.417 0.381  1.696** 0.012 
Leverage  +  0.142 0.913  0.291 0.341  0.195 0.645 
Negative ROA Indicator  +  -0.735 0.277  -0.834* 0.075  -0.871 0.121 
Natural Log of Non-Audit Fees  ?  -0.285 0.138  0.086 0.306  -0.103 0.537 
Intercept a0 ?  -1.240*** 0.000  -1.136*** 0.000  -1.261*** 0.000 
            
Year Fixed Effects    Included  Included  Included 
Industry Fixed Effects    No  No  No 
            
F-test: 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
a0 + a1 = 0 ? -2.204*** 0.000 -1.383*** 0.000 -1.488*** 0.000 
a0 + a1 + a3 = 0 ? -3.319*** 0.000 -0.674 0.267 -0.982 0.182 
            
N    148  297  411 
Pseudo R2     0.145  0.066  0.099 
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Panel B. Conditional on Change in Audit Fees 
 
  
Variables 
 Pred. 
Sign 
  Financial Expert  Three-Member  Independence 
  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
POST a1 ?   
 
-0.921** 0.026  
 
-0.161 0.657  
 
-0.019 0.909 
High Change a2 ? 0.463 0.432 0.606 0.107 1.090*** 0.000 
POST*High Change a3 ? -0.333 0.504 0.081 0.844 -0.291 0.299 
Natural Log of Total Assets  ?  0.168 0.368  -0.117 0.513  -0.037 0.816 
Return on Assets  -  -5.815** 0.016  -2.203 0.362  -1.912 0.304 
Inventories and Receivables to Total Assets  +  -0.671 0.561  0.817 0.290  0.647 0.395 
Big N Indicator  -  -0.864 0.303  0.948 0.327  0.960 0.168 
Segments  +  0.820* 0.050  0.011 0.963  -0.060 0.581 
Return Volatility  +  1.670 0.530  -1.301 0.693  2.660 0.314 
Merger Indicator  +  -0.165 0.611  -0.191 0.509  -0.662** 0.035 
Large Capital Issuance Indicator  +  0.982 0.135  0.404* 0.074  0.046 0.770 
Foreign Operations Indicator  +  0.465* 0.077  0.125 0.582  -0.196 0.187 
Book-to-Market  ?  -0.009 0.986  0.443 0.361  1.457** 0.027 
Leverage  +  0.093 0.947  0.090 0.800  0.057 0.897 
Negative ROA Indicator  +  -0.845 0.225  -0.805 0.104  -0.886 0.146 
Natural Log of Non-Audit Fees  ?  -0.298 0.133  0.087 0.339  -0.069 0.686 
Intercept a0 ?  -1.452*** 0.000  -1.636*** 0.000  -1.830*** 0.000 
            Year Fixed Effects    Included  Included  Included 
Industry Fixed Effects    No  No  No 
            F-test: 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
a0 + a1 = 0 ? -2.373*** 0.000 -1.797*** 0.000 -1.849*** 0.000 
a0+ a1 + a3 = 0 ? -2.706*** 0.000 -1.716*** 0.000 -2.140*** 0.000 
            N    148  297  411 
Pseudo R2     0.142  0.074  0.127 
This table presents results from Logit regressions of the difference in the likelihood of restatement between non-compliant and compliant firms. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the 
non-compliant firm-year is restated and the compliant firm-year is not restated, and 0 otherwise. Panel A reports results where High Change takes the value of 1 if the non-compliant firm 
changed to an ISA in the post period, and 0 otherwise. Panel B reports results where High Change takes the value of 1 if the change in audit fees scaled by total assets in the post period for the 
non-compliant firm is greater than the median change, and 0 otherwise. With the exception of the POST indicator, all other independent variables are computed as the difference between the 
non-compliant observation and the matched compliant observation. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. P-values are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering by year. 
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Table 8. Sensitivity Analysis Based on Full Sample  
 
Panel A. Audit Fees 
 
  
Variables 
 Pred. 
Sign 
  Financial Expert  Three-Member  Independence 
  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Non-Compliant   ?   -0.158*** 0.009  -0.034 0.585  0.063 0.334 
POST  ?  1.008*** 0.000  1.017*** 0.000  1.026*** 0.000 
POST*Non-Compliant  ?  0.144*** 0.000  0.102*** 0.001  -0.009 0.859 
Intercept  ?  -3.255*** 0.000  -3.077*** 0.000  -3.181*** 0.000 
Controls    Included  Included  Included 
            
N    2,061  2,210  2,324 
R2     0.831  0.828  0.832 
 
 
Panel B. Industry Specialist Auditor 
 
  
Variables 
 Pred. 
Sign 
  Financial Expert  Three-Member  Independence 
  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Non-Compliant   ?   0.012 0.969  -0.762** 0.027  0.150 0.498 
POST  ?  -0.189 0.511  -0.359 0.109  -0.408** 0.041 
POST*Non-Compliant  ?  0.566** 0.030  1.075*** 0.000  0.211** 0.035 
Intercept  ?  -8.007*** 0.002  -8.712*** 0.001  -7.676*** 0.001 
Controls    Included  Included  Included 
            
N    2,061  2,210  2,324 
Pseudo R2     0.054  0.058  0.064 
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Panel C. Restatements  
 
  
Variables 
 Pred. 
Sign 
  Financial Expert  Three-Member  Independence 
  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Non-Compliant   ?   0.579* 0.084  0.445* 0.084  0.373 0.119 
POST  ?  -0.621*** 0.002  -0.364* 0.068  -0.320** 0.050 
POST*Non-Compliant  ?  -0.119 0.178  -0.057 0.717  -0.104 0.592 
Intercept  ?  0.830 0.508  -0.159 0.902  0.263 0.842 
Controls    Included  Included  Included 
            
N    2,061  2,210  2,324 
Pseudo R2     0.055  0.055  0.057 
 
 
Panel D. Restatement Analysis Conditional on Change in Audit Fee 
 
  
Variables 
 Pred. 
Sign 
  Financial Expert  Three-Member  Independence 
  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Non-Compliant   ?   0.559 0.102  0.440* 0.089  0.379 0.109 
POST  ?  -0.620*** 0.002  -0.366* 0.091  -0.349** 0.043 
POST*Non-Compliant 
 
? 
 
-0.596** 0.038 
 
 
-0.614 0.142 
 
 
-0.552 0.191 
High Change ? 0.136 0.549 0.173 0.429 0.194 0.363 
POST*Non-Compliant*High Change ? 0.607 0.211 0.841 0.106 0.820* 0.090 
Intercept  ?  0.563 0.667  -0.414 0.754  -0.176 0.897 
Controls    Included  Included  Included 
            
N    2,061  2,210  2,324 
Pseudo R2     0.056  0.059  0.061 
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Panel E. Restatement Analysis Conditional on Change to ISA 
 
  
Variables 
 Pred. 
Sign 
  Financial Expert  Three-Member  Independence 
  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Non-Compliant   ?   0.557* 0.093  0.426 0.104  0.365 0.128 
POST  ?  -0.651*** 0.001  -0.369* 0.073  -0.330** 0.047 
POST*Non-Compliant 
 
? 
 
0.105 0.216 
 
 
-0.080 0.659 
 
 
-0.148 0.532 
High Change ? 0.407 0.149 0.267 0.336 0.306 0.267 
POST*Non-Compliant*High Change ? -1.319** 0.030 0.092 0.873 0.285 0.650 
Intercept  ?  0.727 0.564  -0.179 0.890  0.241 0.856 
Controls    Included  Included  Included 
            
N    2,061  2,210  2,324 
Pseudo R2     0.059  0.057  0.059 
This table replicates the analyses in Tables 4 through 7 using the entire sample of non-compliant firms. Non-Compliant takes the value of 1 if the firm was not compliant with a particular 
requirement and zero otherwise. For example, in the Financial Expert column, Non-Compliant takes the value of 1 if the firm was not compliant with the financial expert requirement and 0 
otherwise. Panel A reports OLS regressions of the natural logarithm of audit fees. Panels B and C report results from Logit regressions of the likelihood of using an ISA and the likelihood of 
restatement, respectively.  Panel D reports Logit regression results of restatements conditional on the change to an ISA in the post period. High Change is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the firm did not use an ISA in the pre period and switched to an ISA in the post period. Panel E reports results where High Change is an indicator equal to 1 if the change in audit 
fees scaled by total assets from the pre to the post period is greater than the median. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denotes two-tailed significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. P-values are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm and year. 
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Table 9: Excluding Transition Years (2003 and 2004)  
 
Panel A. Audit Fees 
 
  
Variables 
 Pred. 
Sign 
  Financial Expert  Three-Member  Independence 
  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
POST a1 ?   0.303* 0.054  0.074* 0.091  0.005 0.772 
Intercept a0 ?  0.666 0.120  -0.970** 0.028  -0.397** 0.025 
Controls     Included  Included  Included 
            
F-test            
a0 + a1 = 0  ?  0.969* 0.097  -0.896** 0.028  -0.392** 0.022 
            
N    96  193  267 
R2     0.762  0.743  0.698 
 
 
 
Panel B. Industry Specialist Auditor 
 
  
Variables 
 Pred. 
Sign 
  Financial Expert  Three-Member  Independence 
  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
POST a1 ?   1.438*** 0.001  0.951*** 0.000  0.117 0.111 
Intercept a0 ?  -2.864*** 0.000  -2.346*** 0.000  -1.345*** 0.000 
Controls     Included  Included  Included 
            
F-test            
a0 + a1 = 0  ?  -1.426*** 0.000  -1.395*** 0.000  -1.229*** 0.000 
            
N    96  193  267 
R2     0.247  0.110  0.059 
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Panel C. Restatements 
 
  
Variables 
 Pred. 
Sign 
  Financial Expert  Three-Member  Independence 
  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
POST a1 ?   -0.621*** 0.002  -0.439*** 0.000  -0.415** 0.028 
Intercept a0 ?  -0.923*** 0.000  -1.487*** 0.000  -1.759*** 0.000 
Controls     Included  Included  Included 
            
F-test            
a0 + a1 = 0  ?  -1.543*** 0.000  -1.926*** 0.000  -2.174*** 0.000 
            
N    96  193  267 
R2     0.192  0.067  0.087 
 
 
Panel D. Restatement Analysis Conditional on Change in Audit Fees 
 
  
Variables 
 Pred. 
Sign 
  Financial Expert  Three-Member  Independence 
  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
POST a1 ?   -1.424*** 0.000  -0.893*** 0.000  -0.490* 0.076 
High Change a2 ?  0.528 0.175  0.397 0.107  1.139*** 0.000 
POST*High Change a3 ?  -0.568 0.229  0.636*** 0.000  0.014 0.972 
Intercept a0 ?  -1.220*** 0.000  -1.750*** 0.000  -2.309*** 0.000 
Controls    Included  Included  Included 
            
F-test            
a0 + a1 = 0  ?  -2.644*** 0.000  -2.643*** 0.000  -2.799*** 0.000 
a0 + a1 + a3 = 0  ?  -3.212*** 0.000  -2.008*** 0.000  -2.785*** 0.000 
            
N    96  193  267 
Pseudo R2     0.196  0.085  0.126 
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Panel E. Restatement Analysis Conditional on Change to Industry Specialist Auditor 
 
  
Variables 
 Pred. 
Sign 
  Financial Expert  Three-Member  Independence 
  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
POST a1 ?   -1.308*** 0.002  -0.704*** 0.000  -0.552** 0.014 
High Change a2 ?  1.387** 0.019  -1.564*** 0.000  -1.213 0.317 
POST*High Change a3 ?  -2.843*** 0.000  1.649*** 0.000  1.428 0.182 
Intercept a0 ?  -1.204*** 0.000  -1.227*** 0.000  -1.635*** 0.000 
Controls    Included  Included  Included 
            
F-test            
a0 + a1 = 0  ?  -2.512*** 0.000  -1.932*** 0.000  -2.188*** 0.000 
a0 + a1 + a3 = 0  ?  -5.355*** 0.000  -0.282 0.423  -0.760 0.489 
            
N    96  193  267 
Pseudo R2     0.225  0.082  0.094 
This table presents the results from the match-sample tests that exclude fiscal years 2003 and 2004. With the exception of the POST and High Change indicator variables, the dependent and 
independent variables are computed as the difference between the non-compliant observation and the matched compliant observation. Panel A reports OLS regressions of the difference in audit 
fees while Panels B and C report results from Logit regressions of the difference in likelihood of using an ISA (Panel B) and the likelihood of restatement (Panel C). Panels D and E report Logit 
regression results of the likelihood of restatement conditioning on the change to an ISA and the change in audit fees, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. ***, **, 
and * denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. P-values are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering by year. 
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Table 10: Restatement Analysis Excluding Restatements with a Positive Net Income Effect  
 
Panel A. Restatement Analysis 
 
  
Variables 
 Pred. 
Sign 
  Financial Expert  Three-Member  Independence 
  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
POST a1 ?   -2.500** 0.043  -0.591*** 0.001  -0.977*** 0.000 
Intercept a0 ?  -1.391*** 0.000  -1.618*** 0.000  -1.502*** 0.000 
Controls     Included  Included  Included 
            
F-test            
a0 + a1 = 0  ?  -3.891*** 0.002  -2.209*** 0.000  -2.480*** 0.000 
            
N    148  297  411 
R2     0.170  0.048  0.095 
 
 
 
Panel B. Restatement Analysis Conditional on Change in Audit Fees  
 
  
Variables 
 Pred. 
Sign 
  Financial Expert  Three-Member  Independence 
  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
POST a1 ?   -2.668* 0.069  -1.668*** 0.000  -1.839*** 0.000 
High Change a2 ?  -0.115 0.797  0.039 0.934  0.538*** 0.009 
POST*High Change a3 ?  0.275 0.622  1.468*** 0.000  1.275*** 0.005 
Intercept a0 ?  -1.313*** 0.000  -1.678*** 0.000  -1.733*** 0.000 
Controls    Included  Included  Included 
            
F-test            
a0 + a1 = 0  ?  -3.981*** 0.006  -3.346*** 0.000  -3.572*** 0.000 
a0 + a1 + a3 = 0  ?  -3.706*** 0.001  -1.878*** 0.001  -2.297*** 0.000 
            
N    148  297  411 
Pseudo R2     0.170  0.075  0.140 
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Panel C. Restatement Analysis Conditional on Change to ISA 
 
  
Variables 
 Pred. 
Sign 
  Financial Expert  Three-Member  Independence 
  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
POST a1 ?   -2.657* 0.051  -0.798*** 0.001  -1.149*** 0.000 
High Change a2 ?  -0.856* 0.094  -0.651 0.193  -0.510 0.309 
POST* High Change a3 ?  0.326 0.697  0.928* 0.074  1.052 0.100 
Intercept a0 ?  -1.241*** 0.000  -1.489*** 0.000  -1.437*** 0.000 
Controls    Included  Included  Included 
            
F-test            
a0 + a1 = 0  ?  -3.898*** 0.005  -2.287*** 0.000  -2.585*** 0.000 
a0 + a1 + a3 = 0  ?  -3.572*** 0.000  -1.359*** 0.007  -1.533*** 0.009 
            
N    148  297  411 
Pseudo R2     0.178  0.053  0.100 
 
This table presents the results from Logit regressions of the difference in the likelihood of restatement between non-compliant and compliant firms, where only those restatements with a 
negative net income effect are considered.  The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the non-compliant firm-year is restated and the compliant firm-year is not restated, and 0 otherwise. 
With the exception of the POST indicator, the independent variables in the regressions are computed as the difference between the non-compliant observation and the matched compliant 
observation. Panel A reports unconditional regressions of the difference in the likelihood of restatement. Panels B and C report regression results of the likelihood of restatement conditioning on 
the change to an ISA and the change in audit fees, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. P-values are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering by year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
